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SECURITIES
On the whole the decisions handed down by the Tenth Cir-
cuit last year relating to securities' will not change the law in this
circuit. Most actions commenced during the term involved al-
leged violations of section 10 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.2 However, a few cases may clarify some earlier policy
statements of the court.
Notable in this past year was the case of Edina State Bank
v. Mr. Steak, Inc.3 That case may resolve the direct conflict be-
tween the federal securities laws and the Uniform Commercial
Code which arises when dealing with the transfer of restricted
securities. The Mr. Steak case is discussed at length in the final
comment of this section.'
I. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY-JOINT REAL ESTATE
VENTURE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973)
In Andrews v. Blue,' an action for rescission of a securities
transaction in which the plaintiff was to receive shares of a
merged corporation for his 20 percent interest in a real estate joint
venture with defendants, the Tenth Circuit held the transaction
did involve a security as defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.6 The transaction did not qualify as a
private offering under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 19331
and thus was not exempt from registration under section 5 of the
1933 Act.' The court upheld the plaintiff's right to recover under
the federal and state securities laws.
In holding that the plaintiffs 20 percent interest in the real
Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1996 (1974); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367
(10th Cir. 1973); Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1973),
petition for cert. filed 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. June 4, 1974) (No. 73-189); Hadsell v.
Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1973).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78j(b) (1970).
484 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1974).
See p. 338 infra.
489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973).
15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970).
7 Id. § 77d(2).
I Id. § 77e.
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estate venture was a security within the meaning of section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 the court cited
with approval the test expounded by the Supreme Court in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co. ,0 There the Court broadly defined a security
as:
A contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of a promoter or a third-party, it being immaterial
whether the shares of the enterprise are evidenced by formal certifi-
cates or by nominal interest in the physical assets employed in the
enterprise."
A major aspect of the venture in the Andrews case was in-
vestment, with an eye toward profits rather than management.
Despite a contract reference to plaintiff as a consultant, plaintiff
was a consultant in name only and defendants, the other partici-
pants in this venture, treated him as an outsider who had no
managerial authority. The court felt that this contract reference
to Andrews as a consultant did not deprive the relationship of its
character as an investment contract thereby making it a secu-
rity.'2
Defendants claimed that the issuance of shares to the plain-
tiff arising out of the merger was a private offering, and therefore,
exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.11 The
court, in rejecting this argument, discussed the criteria developed
in the case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co." In that case the Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine the meaning of the
term "public offering." In interpreting section 4(2)'" it concluded
that the transaction is exempt from registration only when an
offeree has had sufficient access to information similar to that
made available to the offeree in a registration statement. So con-
sidered, an offering is private when made "to those who are shown
able to fend for themselves."'" In Andrews, the Tenth Circuit
found that plaintiff did not have access to all relative information
regarding the offering. Furthermore, the court determined that
' Id. § 78c(lO).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Id. at 299.
12 489 F.2d at 375.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
1 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
346 U.S. at 125.
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the defendants had induced plaintiff into the investment by ma-
terially misleading statements designed to depreciate the plain-
tiff's interest in the property and enhance the value of their own.' 7
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these
statements. In addition, the court found that the small number
of shares issued and the restrictive legend on the face of the shares
were not, in themselves, sufficient to make this offering private. 8
Finally, the defendants claimed that the offering was exempt
from registration because they were neither issuers nor underwri-
ters and hence within the purview of section 4(1) of the 1933 Act."
The court found the defendants were issuers under section 2(11)
of the 1933 Act 20 because they were controlling persons of the
issuing corporation, and they were underwriters because they re-




Four Tenth Circuit cases during this term arose out of fraud-
ulent transactions and all were commenced alleging violations of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 and other
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
A. Hadsell v. Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1974)
In an action by a purchaser of unregistered securities alleging
violations of the antifraud provisions against a seller who agreed
to repurchase the securities, the Tenth Circuit held, in Hadsell
v. Hoover,'2 3 that the repurchase agreement did not preclude the
buyer from maintaining an action under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.24 Defendant-appellant, while not
contesting the sufficiency or credibility of the evidence, argued
that there was no fraud involved in the sale of the securities. At
best, the defendant claimed there existed only an action for
breach of contract on the repurchase agreement.
In dismissing this argument, the court cited the broad reme-
dial purposes of the federal securities laws and earlier Tenth Cir-
cuit cases describing the requisites for an action under section
,7 489 F.2d at 373.
, Id. at 374.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
Id. § 77b(11).
21 489 F.2d at 375.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10(b)(5)
promulgated thereunder.2
B. United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973)
In United States v. MacKay,"8 defendants, acting through a
corporation, devised and implemented a scheme to take control
of an insurance company and strip it of its assets for the fraudu-
lent purposes of purchasing its stock. The scheme was carried out
by use of a jurisdictional means, that is, the use of the mails or
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit discusses, in general, the
basis of fraud action under the federal securities laws." In its
discussion of a jurisdictional means, the court noted that it is
fundamental that an accused need not carry out the mailing or use
of the instrumentality of commerce. If he causes it to be carried out
by setting forces in motion which foreseeably result in the use of the
mails, his action is sufficient.8
Finally, the court reaffirmed the law in the Tenth Circuit in
regard to the truth or falsity of fraudulent statements: "The law
is that a statement made which is patently false or made with
reckless indifference to its truth or falsity can be equivalent to
intent to defraud." 9
C. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494
F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,30
an investor brought an action seeking damages against a broker-
age house for "churning" of her account. After noting that courts
are in general agreement that "churning" in this context consti-
tutes fraud,3 ' the Tenth Circuit held the 2-year statute of limita-
tions is not a bar to plaintiff's action claiming her broker engaged
in excessive trading of her account in order to generate commis-
sions. 2 As in the case of any action based in fraud, the statute
5 Id. § 78j(b).
491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 619.
n Id.
" Id. at 623.
- 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
31 Id.
12 The court held that "the Oklahoma two-year statute applies." Id. at 171. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. § 408(e) (1965) provides that "[n]o person may sue [for a violation of a
security law] more than two years after the contract of sale."
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starts running from the date of actual or constructive discovery
of the fraud, that is, when the plaintiff has become fully aware
that she has been victimized. In this instance, the court held that
because "churning" is conduct which is not common to the expe-
rience of the ordinary individual, the issue as to whether the
plaintiff in a case such as this is to be charged with knowledge is
essentially one of fact subject to determination by the jury. The
court allowed the plaintiff a trial on the question of when she
actually became aware of the "churning" activity, and further
held that the sophistication of the investor is an important con-
sideration in determining when the investor had knowledge of
this "churning."
D. Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974)
Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko 31 involved an action by the
corporate purchaser of all the stock in the second corporation
against the seller of the stock and the accounting firm, which
prepared the financial report in connection with the sale, of fraud,
negligence, and violation of the Securities Act of 1933.3 The
Tenth Circuit found the absence of any fraud on the part of the
defendant-seller and the accounting firm, and held that evidence
did in fact support a finding of fraud on the part of the purchaser.
This was basically an action for common law fraud in which
the plaintiff alleged violation of the federal securities laws. The
court found no conspiracy by either the seller or the accounting
firm to defraud or to violate the Securities Act, citing Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,8 and Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. , as the standard to be followed.
Finally, the court held that where the purchaser of securities
knew that the financial report of a corporation being prepared by
an accounting firm was being drawn for another potential pur-
chaser and where the purchaser did not show reliance on the
representations in the financial statement, the accounting firm
was not liable to the purchaser for fraud.3
Michael L. Corrigan
= 494 F.2d at 172.
- 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
" 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
474 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1973).
494 F.2d at 717.
1975
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III. TRANSFER OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES
Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1974)
Price, who had been an employee of Mr. Steak, Inc. (Mr.
Steak), received 2,400 shares of unregistered Mr. Steak stock in
January 1969,' in a private placement,2 representing that he was
taking the stock for investment purposes. No restriction was
noted on the stock certificates and Price did not sign an invest-
ment letter.3 In April 1969, Mr. Steak filed a registration state-
ment covering 300,000 shares of its stock, but Price's shares were
not included in the statement. In March 1969, Price negotiated a
series of loans with the Edina State Bank (Bank). Those loans
were consolidated into a single $27,000 note dated May 5, 1969,
secured by Price's 2,400 shares of Mr. Steak stock.
In early June 1969, the Bank attempted to realize on the
collateral by turning over 1000 of the Mr. Steak shares to a broker
for sale. The broker sold the stock, remitting $37,000 to the Bank.
That amount was credited to Price's checking account which was
then debited in the amount of the outstanding loan. The $27,000
note was canceled and Price's loan account was closed.
When the broker presented the certificates to Mr. Steak's
transfer agent, Central Bank and Trust Company (Central),
transfer was refused. Central had received a stop-transfer notice
from Mr. Steak covering its shares issued in private offering. The
notice required Central not to register a transfer of those shares
without first notifying Mr. Steak and getting an opinion of coun-
sel that the proposed transfer would not violate the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act).' The broker returned the stock to the
Bank, which reimbursed the broker out of its own funds.
The recitation of facts is taken from the opinion of the circuit court in Edina State
Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1973), and Pre-Trial Order, June
14, 1971, and Record of Hearing, Feb. 7, 1972, in Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc.,
D.C. No. C-2611 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 1972).
A sale of securities is exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1971), if it does not involve a public offering, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1971). Mr. Steak intended to qualify for that exemption with respect to Price's
stock. Stock issued under that exemption must be restricted in the hands of a private
offeree in order to insure that no public offering is involved. See text accompanying notes
25-30 infra.
I An investment letter and a notation of restriction on the stock certificate are factors
considered by the SEC in determining the availability of the private offering exemption.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5121 (Dec. 30, 1970); SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). The precautions assist the issuer in preserving its exemption.
I The combination of the stop-transfer notice and the opinion of counsel are also
common practices by issuers seeking to protect their exemptions. Folk, Article Eight: A
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The Bank then requested that Price return the $37,000, but
he was unable to do so. Instead, he signed a new note, dated June
30, 1969, for $37,000, secured by the same 2400 Mr. Steak shares.
Price defaulted on the loan. The Bank attempted to register
transfer of the stock then, and again in April 1970, with no suc-
cess.5 By mid-1970, the value of the stock had dropped to $4.00
per share. In September 1970, the Bank sued Mr. Steak and
Central in Federal District Court of Colorado for damages for
wrongful refusal to transfer the stock under Article 8 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC).
Judgment in the district court was for the defendants. Judge
Chilson held that the disposition of the case was governed not by
the UCC but by the Securities Act, by which the federal govern-
ment had pre-empted the field. Since the refusal to transfer was
based on compliance with the federal law, defendants incurred no
liability under state law.
The judgment was reversed on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.' The court relied on section 8-204 of
the UCC:
Unless conspicuously noted on the security, a restriction on transfer
imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective
except against a person with actual knowledge of it.'
Since the certificates contained no notation of restriction and
the court felt that the Bank had no knowledge of the restriction,
the Bank was allowed to recover. This finding is problematic in
two aspects:
(1) At the time the $37,000 note (the note on which the
action is based) was executed, the Bank had knowledge
of the restriction.
(2) There is no absolute right of recovery under section
8-204 for unnoted restrictions. The remedy is provided
by the common law and section 8-401(2), for which
Premise and Three Problems, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1379, 1399 (1967); Israels, Stop-Transfer
Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 8, 17 RtrrERs L. REV. 158, 164 (1962).
1 The bank was informed that transfer would be registered if it would submit the
required opinion of counsel. An acceptable opinion was never tendered. Plaintiff's Exhib-
its 6-8, Defendants' Exhibits F & G, record, vol. H, at 23-25, 30-31.
Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1973).
This section of the UCC has been adopted without amendment in every state, 3 R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204:2 (2d ed. 1971).
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there are certain prerequisites not discussed by the
court.
These problems will be explored further in the body of this com-
ment.
The court then addressed itself to the pre-emption issue.
Disagreeing with the district court, it held that section 8-204 of
the UCC could and should be read in harmony with the federal
securities laws since there is no evidence of congressional intent
to prohibit state regulation in the area.' The court refused to
reach the questions of whether the contemplated transfer would
have violated the Securities Act and what effect such violation
would have had on the parties. Instead, the court simply held
that the Bank was entitled to damages under UCC section 8-204
and that recovery of such damages "is not violative of the federal
prohibition against transfer."9
Additionally, the court rejected defendants' contention that
the Bank failed to mitigate its damages as it could have by fur-
nishing the necessary opinion of counsel required to register
transfer of the shares while the price of the stock remained high.
Because the restriction on the stock was unnoted, and therefore
ineffective under section 8-204, the court held that the Bank had
no such duty to mitigate and was entitled to recover for its full
loss.
Presently, the Supreme Court has before it a petition for
certiorari in this case, filed by the defendants.'0 The Association
of Stock Transfer Agents, Inc., has petitioned for leave to file a
brief amicus curiae in support of the petition for certiorari. The
petitioners argue that the circuit court's decision places issuers
and transfer agents in an untenable position. When a request is
made for transfer of an unlegended security that is restricted
because of the Securities Act, they must choose between register-
ing the transfer and risking a violation of the Securities Act or
refusing to register transfer and thereby incurring liability for
refusal to transfer." This comment will discuss whether such a
See text accompanying note 41 infra.
487 F.2d at 645.
tO Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S.
June 4, 1974) (No. 73-1789).
1 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 4, Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. June 4, 1974) (No. 73-1789); Brief for Stock Transfer
Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 9, id.
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dilemma is the necessary result of the laws governing securities
and what alternatives are available.
I. ARTICLE EIGHT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The purpose of Article 8 of the UCC is to render investment
securities freely negotiable.' 2 Section 8-204 serves this purpose by
denying effectiveness to any restrictions on transferability which
are not noted on the stock certificate, except against persons with
actual knowledge of the restriction.
A. The Knowledge Requirement
The Bank argued that the restrictions on the Mr. Steak stock
had no validity as to it because they were not noted on the certifi-
cates. The facts of the case indicate that the Bank had actual
knowledge of the restrictions on Price's stock when the final note,
which formed the basis of the suit, was executed.'3 Prior to June
30, 1969, the Bank had attempted to transfer the stock and
learned of the existence and nature of the restriction. Thus the
Bank had actual and full knowledge of the restriction, in which
case section 8-204 affords it no protection.'
4
Neither the district court nor the circuit court took the view
that the Bank had knowledge of the restriction. It is clear that
the Bank did not possess actual knowledge of the restriction prior
to June 1969.' 5 If the $37,000 note is viewed merely as a consolida-
tion of the previous loans, then it is arguable that the Bank lacked
the requisite knowledge, because a consolidation note does not
discharge the prior obligations and rights of the parties." In this
case, however, the new note was executed for a new obligation,
since money had changed hands in satisfaction of the old note
and the amount due was increased.' 7 Knowing that Price's finan-
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-105; § 8-101, Comment; § 8-105, Comment 1; Folk,
supra note 4, at 1379; Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw. 676, 678 (1958).
13 Record, vol. I, at 29. UCC section 1-201(25) does not define "knowledge" but does
distinguish it from "reason to know." The standard is clearly subjective. Adrian Tabin
Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66, 256 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608
(1974); McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tenn. 1973).
1, B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974); Norman v. Jerich Corp., 263 Ore.
259, 501 P.2d 305 (1972).
" Record, vol. I, at 27.
I American Trust Co. v. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau Inc., 207 F.2d
685 (2d Cir. 1953); Bowden v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d'406,
224 P.2d 713 (1950).
1 King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 616, 26 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1943); Meinholtz v. Lam-
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cial condition was precarious, the Bank went ahead and accepted
a new note secured by the stock it then knew to be restricted.
Since the Bank then had actual knowledge of the restriction,
notation on the certificate was not necessary to make the restric-
tion effective. Factually, then, this case seems not to require dis-
cussion of conflict between the federal securities laws and the
UCC. Nevertheless, the courts have not resolved the dispute fac-
tually.
B. The Nature of Recovery
Since the Tenth Circuit took the view that the Bank did not
have knowledge of the restriction on the Mr. Steak stock, it
granted the Bank recovery under section 8-204 of the UCC. That
section, however, provides no remedy; it merely describes the
prerequisites for "effectiveness" of a restriction on the transfer of
stock. Where an issuer or transfer agent refuses to transfer stock
because it is restricted but that restriction is not effective under
8-204, Comment 1 to that section notes that a conversion has
occurred and "the issuer can be compelled to register the transfer
under the policy of Part 4 of this Article." If a purchaser desires
to recover damages rather than compel transfer, he must sue for
conversion or proceed under section 8-401 of the UCC.
A common law conversion is said to occur when an issuer
wrongfully refuses to register a requested transfer of stock."8 While
no clear definition of "wrongful" has developed under case law,
cases under section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the
predecessor of UCC section 8-204, indicate that a refusal to trans-
fer based on an ineffective restriction constitutes a form of con-
version." Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and sec-
tion 8-204 of the UCC have been interpreted as having the same
meaning.20
In this case, Mr. Steak contended that its refusal to register
the transfer was not wrongful because a transfer would have
pert, 101 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Mo. App. 1937); Elisberg v. Simpson, 173 N.Y.S. 128, 130
(1918); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dvorak, 199 N.W.2d 414, 416-17 (N.D. 1972).
IS Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1952); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Wilson, 101 Colo. 511, 75 P.2d
149 (1937); Holmes v. Birtman Electric Co., 18 Ill. 2d 554, 165 N.E.2d 261 (1960).
11 Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P.2d 205 (1943); Hulse v. Consoli-
dated Quicksilver Mining Corp., 65 Idaho 768, 154 P.2d 149 (1944); Doss v. Yingling, 95
Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
1 Irwin v. West End Div. Co., 481 F.2d 34, 38 (10th Cir. 1973); B & H Warehouse,
Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 517, 523 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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caused a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act.2 This line of
argument is discussed in detail in the treatment of UCC 8-401
below, but it should be noted here that a similar argument was
rejected in Texas under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. In
Prudential Petroleum Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co.,22 the cor-
poration was engaged in an offering under Regulation A of the
Securities Act.' In order to obtain SEC approval for that offering,
it closed its books as to transfers of previously-issued stock. As a
result, a transfer of previously-issued stock was refused although
the restriction was not on the certificates. The court permitted
recovery for conversion noting, however, that the refusal to trans-
fer was not wrongful. Seemingly, a refusal to transfer based on a
restriction that is ineffective under the statutes constitutes an
independent ground for an action for conversion.
In the fact pattern of Mr. Steak, the existence of an auto-
matic recovery for an unnoted restriction placed the issuer in the
unfortunate position of having to choose between two courses of
action both of which could attract liability. A transfer agent,
however, can incur no liability under the common law for a re-
fusal to register a transfer of stock.24 The Bank thus could not
recover against Central for conversion. Section 8-406(1)(b) of the
UCC changes that rule by imposing on a transfer agent the same
liability as that of an issuer. Since the Bank recovered against
Central, it must have been under the UCC.
The Bank was seeking the type of recovery granted in section
8-401(2):
Where an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a security
the issuer is also liable to the person presenting it for registration
... for loss resulting from . . . refusal to register the transfer.
The duty to transfer arises when the conditions in section 8-401(1)
are satisfied. The only requirement possibly not met in Mr. Steak
is found in section 8-401(1)(e). In order for there to be no duty to
transfer under that section, the transfer must in fact not be right-
ful and it must not be to a bona fide purchaser. Defendants in
Mr. Steak made the argument that transfer to the Bank (or its
21 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1971).
281 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
17 C.F.R. 230.251-63 (1974).
2, Under agency law, a transfer agent is only liable for breach of duty to his principal.
Mears v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 97 Cal. App. 2d 482, 218 P.2d 91, 92 (1950); Lenhart
Altschuler Assocs. v. Benjamin, 28 Misc. 2d 602, 215 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1961).
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purchaser) would not in fact be rightful because it would cause a
violation of the Securities Act.
Price received his stock in a private placement, exempt from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act under section
4(2) as a transaction not involving a public offering."8 If the SEC
finds that the transaction did involve a public offering, the ex-
emption will no longer be available and the issuer will have sold
securities in violation of section 5.26 A public offering is synony-
mous with a distribution, 7 and anyone who purchases from an
issuer with a view to distribution of a security is an underwriter."8
If the purchaser of a privately-placed security does not hold the
stock for a sufficiently long period, he is considered to have pur-
chased the security with a view to distribution, making him an
underwriter. 9 Thus the entire private offering loses its exemption
on an improper resale of some of the securities and anyone taking
part in that sale will have violated section 5.30
The stock involved in Mr. Steak was issued to Price in Janu-
ary 1969. The Bank attempted to transfer it in the summer of
1969 and again in the spring of 1970. Whether transfer at that
time would have caused a violation of section 5 can only be re-
solved by looking at the facts. The court did not reach this ques-
tion, and the necessary analysis is outside the scope of this com-
ment." Since the burden of proving the availability of an exemp-
tion is upon the party claiming the exemption 3 (in this case, the
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1971). See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953);
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
"7 Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS
162 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat Report].
- 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
" United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., SEC Release No. 33-3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); Israels, Problems Incident to
the Use of Stop-Transfer Procedures, 18 Bus. LAW. 85 (1962).
1 SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960); 4 L. Loss, SECURrrIEs
REGULATION 2657 (Supp. 1969).
"' Today, rule 144, 17 C.F.R. 230.144 (1974), would provide a method of resale that
would protect all involved parties. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5223 (Jan. 1, 1972);
SEC Securities Act Relase No. 33-5306 (Sept. 26, 1972). For discussion of permissible
resale of privately-placed stock outside of rule 144, see SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), and Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-3825 (Sept. 20, 1957).
n SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967). The Bank would have had to show
that Price was not an underwriter, thus entitling the Bank to transfer the shares without
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Bank) and the Bank never supplied the opinion of counsel re-
quested by defendants that would have indicated the availability
of the exemption, the court could have found that a transfer of
Price's stock would have caused a violation of section 5.33
The UCC does not specify what transfers are "in fact right-
ful" within the meaning of section 8-401(1)(e), but a transfer that
would cause a violation of the federal securities laws would ap-
pear not to qualify. One of the leading commentators on Article
8 has said that such a transfer "is hardly rightful. ' 34 However, the
only cases holding that a transfer which would cause a violation
of the Securities Act would be wrongful involved restrictions
which were noted on the certificates. 35 Clearly, such a transfer
would be wrongful, as would an attempt to transfer stock not
owned by the transferor. The word "wrongful" here should proba-
bly apply to the transfer itself and not the effect of the transfer.
That construction substantially weakens the contention that any
transfer that would cause a violation of the Securities Act is not
rightful.
In order to show that there is no duty to transfer under sec-
tion 8-401(1)(e), it is also necessary that the transfer not be re-
quested by a bona fide purchaser. For the purpose of Article 8, a
bona fide purchaser is one who purchases without notice of an
adverse claim. 36 A claim that a transfer would be wrongful is an
adverse claim, 37 and notice includes "reason to know" based on
all the facts and circumstances s.3 The determination of whether
registering them under a section 4(1) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), for a transac-
tion not by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
3 Had a violation of section 5 been found, Mr. Steak would have lost its section 4(2)
exemption for the entire private offering and Central would have been liable as an aider
and abettor. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960). The Bank could
also be a violator under the rule of that case, depending on its state of mind when it took
the pledge of stock. See Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Sargent, The Guild Films Case: The Effect of "Good Faith" in Foreclosure of Unregistered
Securities Pledged as Collateral, 46 VA. L. REv. 1573, 1578 (1960).
1 Israels, supra note 29, at 89. Israels makes the same point in 17 RUTGERS L. REV.
supra note 4, at 164.
" Kenler v. Canal Nat'l Bank, 489 F.2d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 1973); Garsarch v. Ormand
Indus. Inc., 346 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Dean Witter & Co. v. Educa-
tional Computer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 757, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
"a UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302. E.g., Miriani v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (N.D.Ill. 1973).
"7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-301(1). E.g., Dean Witter & Co. v. Educational
Computer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 757, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(25). E.g., Victory Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma
State Bank, 520 P.2d 675, 678 (Okla. 1973).
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the transferee is a bona fide purchaser will be a factual one, and
the facts 9 in this case tended to show that the Bank was on notice
of the possibility that Price's stock was restricted, despite Price's
representations otherwise."°
It is possible, then, that Central could have avoided liability
in this case by showing that the Bank had notice of the fact that
Price received his shares in a private offering and that a transfer
which would cause a violation of the Securities Act is a wrongful
transfer. The circuit court declined to reach this issue, but if it
had, it would have found little case law in support of Central's
position. Without this defense, Central was subjected to liability
for acts completely outside its control. Additionally, the defense
would never be successful where a purchaser or pledgee is without
notice of a restriction, because he would be a bona fide purchaser
entitled to transfer regardless of the wrongfulness of such trans-
fer.
The combination of the UCC and the Securities Act in situa-
tions such as that in Mr. Steak creates unacceptable results. Both
issuer and transfer agent must choose between liability under one
of the two acts. When state and federal law clash in this manner,
a question of pre-emption arises.
I1. PRE-EMPTION
When there is an apparent pre-emption issue, the courts
begin by looking at the purposes of the laws in question. The
Supreme Court has set up the process as follows:
Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal
statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially
a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two
statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether
they are in conflict."
" The officer handling the loan knew that Mr. Steak was a privately-held company
that was about to make a public offering. He was also knowledgeable in the securities field.
Record, vol. I, at 26-28.
,0 Perhaps it should be noted that the Bank considered Price "financially irresponsi-
ble" after July 1969. Record, vol. I, at 4, 24. No action has been taken against him even
though he remains liable on the $37,000 note and may also be liable for his misrepresen-
tations as to the restrictions on the pledged stock, Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262
N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964).
'1 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). In Mr. Steak, the court primarily
focused on congressional intent to pre-empt, 487 F.2d at 645-46, and found none. That
inquiry is relevant where "[bloth regulations can be enforced without impairing federal
superintendence of the field," id., which the court found here. There are, however, situa-
tions in which UCC section 8-204 and the Securities Act are not harmonious. See text
accompanying notes 43-46, infra.
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There have been extensive statements of purpose by the legisla-
tures, courts, and commentators concerning both the UCC and
the Securities Act. Article 8 of the UCC has as its purpose the
promotion of free trading in securities, and in order to achieve
that aim it gives investment securities the attributes of negotia-
bility.42 The basic purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the
investing public by insuring that purchasers are fully informed
about the venture in which they are investing. 3
The Securities Act requires a registration statement and the
use of prospectus in the sale of securities in order to achieve the
Act's purpose." An exception from those requirements has been
granted for private offerings because the private offerees do not
require the protection of the Act.45 The exemption is closely cir-
cumscribed, however, to insure that the unregistered securities do
not get into the hands of uninformed investors, the persons the
Act was designed to protect. Since an issuer is liable if its
privately-placed securities are distributed to the public,4" restric-
tions on sales are imposed on those securities. These restrictions
exist at the time of the original issue of the stock and can be noted
on the certificates at that time. There are situations, however, in
which issuers will be unable to note the restrictions on the certifi-
cates.47 Whether restrictions are noted or not is irrelevant under
the Securities Act; when any restricted security is sold in viola-
tion of the Act, liability arises. The UCC's purpose of full negotia-
" See note 11 supra.
a SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); A.C. Frost
& Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941); Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp.
55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Israels, supra note 11, at -78.
,3 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1971).
' See note 24 supra; WHAT REPorr at 160.
'3 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
For example, private placement restrictions may lapse after a few years and holders
of that stock may require the issuer to remove the legend from their certificates. SEC No-
Action Letter, May 22, 1970 (unpublished). At a later date, the issuer may make an
offering under Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. 230.251-63 (1974), and the SEC will then require
that the transfer books be closed as to the earlier-issued stock as in Prudential Petroleum
Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co., 281 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). The temporary
moratorium on transfer cannot be shown on the certificates.
Another troublesome situation arises when an issuer seeks to protect itself from sec-
ondary liability on a distribution by a control person by giving its transfer agent a stop-
transfer notice on stock registered to control persons. Such stock may well have been
acquired on the open market, making it very difficult for the issuer to get notice of the
restriction onto the certificates. This problem arose but was not resolved in Travis Inv.
Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion, see
Israels, supra note 28, at 86-89.
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bility runs counter to the aim of the Securities Act in this situa-
tion. There is a potential conflict here that manifested itself in
the fact situation of the Mr. Steak case.
Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, a conflict
between a state and a federal law must be resolved in favor of the
federal law." The federal law will oust state law only to the extent
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the federal act. 9 According
to that formula, the conflict between section 8-204 of the UCC
and the Securities Act should be resolved by reading section 8-
204 as invalidating all unnoted restrictions except those placed on
securities in order to insure compliance with the Securities Act.
Arguably, the latter restrictions need not be noted on the certifi-
cate in order to be effective.
Farmer's Educational & Cooperative Union of America v.
WDA Y, Inc. ," supports the type of resolution made above. In that
case, the defendant permitted a political candidate air time in
compliance with the federal equal time law.5 As a result of the
candidate's broadcast, the defendant was sued for libel. The
court noted that WDAY was forbidden to censor a candidate's
remarks under the equal time law and also that the station ran
the risk of not having its license renewed if it denied air time to
all candidates. In other words, in order to keep from running afoul
of the FCC, WDAY had to give time to all candidates and allow
them to say whatever they chose. The court refused to "sanction
the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps crimi-
nal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute de-
mands of the licensee."52 As a result, the court read the equal time
statute as necessarily immunizing broadcasters from libel actions
arising out of candidates' remarks.1
3
In this case, the statute demands that the issuer keep its
unregistered stock out of the hands of the uninformed public. In
most situations, that requirement will not cause any problems
with state law because issuers do try to place a legend on their
restricted stock. Even where issuers cannot note restrictions on all
Is See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963);
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
"' Elliott v. Blumb, 356 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1966); Dix v. Rodgers, 269 F.2d 84, 88
(2d Cir. 1959).
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
5' Id. at 526.




certificates,54 the Securities Act still requires that the stock not
be transferred in violation thereof, but state law says the restric-
tion is ineffective against anyone without knowledge of it. In order
not to frustrate the underlying purposes of the federal law, the
courts should give precedence to federal laws.55 In other words,
where an issuer or a transfer agent stands faced with the choice
that defendants in Mr. Steak had-transfer and be in violation
of the Securities Act or refuse to transfer and be subject to liabil-
ity under state laws-the courts should immunize them from
liability under state law for acting in consonance with the federal
law. This resolution will protect issuers and especially transfer
agents from liability where they cannot effectively control the
behavior that creates the liability, while at the same time leaving
the purchaser several paths of recourse against the person selling
him the restricted security.5 This is probably the best possible
judicial resolution of the case. It does, however, have the addi-
tional effect of immunizing issuers from liability for an unnoted
restriction when noting the restriction would have been a simple
task. The court in Mr. Steak may well have declined to find pre-
emption by the Securities Act in order to avoid the frustration of
the UCC. Unfortunately, the decision in Mr. Steak will lead to
equally frustrating and inequitable results in other fact situa-
tions.
III. CONCLUSION
The aim of Article 8, and section 8-204 in particular, was to
enable a stock purchaser to know what he was getting simply by
looking at the stock certificate. If issuers need to restrict their
stock, they are given the burden of making that restriction effec-
tive. In most cases, issuers will have no difficulty noting restric-
tions on their stock certificates and they should be responsible for
doing so. They should not be subject to liability on an unnoted
restriction when it is beyond their power to get legends onto the
necessary certificates. 7 Perhaps the ideal rule would be to immu-
nize issuers from liability for an unnoted restriction only when
See note 47 supra.
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
56 The seller would incur potential liability on the underlying contract, as well as
liability for misrepresentation of the transferability of the stock under the theory of Alt-
man v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964), and possibly under
rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1974). Also the seller will have breached his warranty that
transfer is rightful under UCC section 8-306(2)(a).
"7 See note 47 supra.
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they are diligent in noting restrictions whenever possible. In those
situations, the purchaser's recovery would have to be from the
seller, who failed to disclose the restriction. When a restriction is
unnoted due to the issuer's negligence, no immunity from UCC
section 8-204 would result. This rule would allocate liability on
the basis of fault and could easily be incorporated into sections
227 and 1603 of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal
Securities Code. Transfer agents should be completely immu-
nized from liability for refusal to transfer based on an unnoted
restriction, since they are not in a position to make sure that
restrictions are noted on the stock they handle. This rule would
have saved Central but not Mr. Steak in the instant case.
The rule that comes out of Mr. Steak makes it imperative
that issuers note all restrictions." Issuers with unlegended re-
stricted stock would be well advised to call in those certificates
and stamp them. Transfer agents would do well to demand in-
demnification agreements from issuers covering liability for un-
noted restrictions. The only way to be absolutely safe would be
to legend all certificates that might possibly be or become re-
stricted with a notation of that possibility. That course of action
would clearly frustrate the aims of the UCC by decreasing the
negotiability of investment securities, but that seems to be the
only way to avoid a potential liability about which the parties can
do nothing.
Mary-Ann Wilson
" State law will support issuers here in that it will require those who take stock
knowing it to be restricted to take legended certificates, General Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139
So. 2d 901 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Short v. Soil Builders Int'l Corp., [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).
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